We analyze three successively more general notions of reversibility and statistical inference: ordinary inverses, disintegrations, and Bayesian inferences. We provide purely categorical definitions of these notions and show how each one is a strictly special instance of the latter in the cases of classical and quantum probability. This provides a categorical foundation for Bayesian inference as a generalization of reversing a process. To properly formulate these ideas, we develop quantum Markov categories by extending recent work of Cho-Jacobs and Fritz on classical Markov categories. We unify Cho-Jacobs' categorical notion of almost everywhere (a.e.) equivalence in a way that is compatible with Parzygnat-Russo's C * -algebraic a.e. equivalence in quantum probability.
Introduction and outline
In his lectures on entropy, Gromov emphasized that concepts in mathematics should frequently be revisited due to our constantly growing and changing perspectives, which may provide new insight on old subjects [12] . Probability theory is no exception, and a dramatic change in viewpoint on the structural foundations of probability theory has gained enormous momentum recently [6] , [14] , [10] . However, most of the guiding examples towards this perspective have come from classical probability theory. Here, we would like to continue our investigation of quantum disintegrations by extending our work [27] to define and incorporate quantum Bayesian inference in abstract probability theory. We will define and analyze the properties of, and relationships between, inverses, disintegrations (also known as regular conditional probabilities or optimal hypotheses), and Bayesian inferences in the general context of reversing dynamics in quantum Markov categories, which are also introduced in this paper. This context is broad enough to include classical and quantum probability. 1 More specifically, we show that invertible maps always have disintegrations and we classify which deterministic maps are invertible in terms of disintegrations. We then prove disintegrations are only possible for deterministic maps and disintegrations are automatically Bayesian inferences. This shows that Bayesian inference is the most general of these three notions of reversibility in the classical and quantum setting, i.e.
Invertible
⇒ Disintegrable ⇒ Bayesian invertible.
In the process of introducing disintegrations, one enlarges their original category to include probabilistic morphisms that optimally reverse certain deterministic dynamics. 2 Hence, one now has new morphisms describing stochastic dynamics. In this work, we show that re-using the notion of a disintegration is not sufficient to reverse these processes optimally. More precisely, if a stochastic morphism has a disintegration, then the original stochastic morphism is necessarily essentially deterministic. Bayesian inference, the third notion of reversibility that we will examine, correctly captures an appropriate reversal procedure that reduces to the disintegration case when the original dynamics is deterministic. Although some of these results hold generally, we prove these claims in our two main categories of interest: the first is the category of finite sets and functions/stochastic maps (conditional probabilities), while the second is the category of finite-dimensional unital C * -algebras and unital * -homomorphisms/completely positive unital maps (quantum operations). 1 Most of our results are stated in the finite-dimensional setting purely for simplicity. Nevertheless, many of the results also hold for von Neumann algebras, though we have not explicitly checked if any continuity conditions (such as normality) are required. 2 Although this is reminiscent of what one does in the localization of a category with respect to a class of morphisms, we have not made any explicit connection. It would be interesting to see the relationship, if one exists. In our setup, one begins with a category of deterministic processes and uses a monad to construct a Kleisli category, whose new morphisms are thought of as describing stochastic dynamics. For classical (quantum) systems, this categorical procedure takes us from evolution described by functions ( * -homomorphisms) on the algebras of observables to evolution described by Markov kernels [17] , [11] (completely positive unital maps [33] ).
The notion of a.e. equivalence 3 in classical probability theory plays an important role in uniqueness properties. In [27] , Russo and the author introduced the notion of a.e. equivalence for maps between C * -algebras equipped with states (or more generally positive functionals) to determine the uniqueness of disintegrations. The definition is simple, intuitive, and is motivated by the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction. In [3] , Cho and Jacobs introduced a categorical formulation of a.e. equivalence valid for any (commutative) Markov category. In this paper, we will show that these two notions agree for * -preserving morphisms 4 in the quantum Markov category of von Neumann algebras. This notion of a.e. equivalence also plays an essential role in determining the uniqueness of quantum Bayesian inverses. Many of the important properties of disintegrations, Bayesian inverses, and their relationships to each other discussed here will be used in forthcoming work on a quantum Bayes' theorem [28] , [26] . Although, the topic of reversibility in quantum mechanics has been studied in great depth in the literature (a small selection of references include [29] , [2] , [23] , [19] , and [20] ), the categorical approach we take here seems novel. The quantum Markov categories we define enable us to reason probabilistically via diagrammatic techniques as a form of two-dimensional algebra, similar to the growing subject of categorical quantum mechanics [5] , [13] .
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 3, we define quantum Markov categories and provide the two main examples used in this work: finite sets with stochastic maps and finite-dimensional C * -algebras with completely positive unital (CPU) maps. Technically, the latter is modified to include all the morphisms needed to make it a quantum Markov category. In Section 4, we adapt Fritz' definition of a positive Markov category (cf. [10, Definition 11.22] ) to the quantum setting. In Theorem 4.5, we prove that the category of CPU maps forms a positive subcategory of the quantum Markov category of linear and conjugate linear maps on finite-dimensional C * -algebras. We then prove the surprising result that ordinary positivity (as opposed to complete positivity) in the quantum setting is not enough to satisfy Fritz' categorical definition of positivity. Section 5 reviews a.e. equivalence and proves several new results: Theorem 5.16 shows that the notion of a.e. equivalence via GNS introduced in [27, Definition 3.16] coincides with one of the two definitions of Cho-Jacobs a.e. equivalence [3, Definition 5.1]. Section 6 defines disintegrations and Bayesian inference in quantum Markov categories. Proposition 6.16 shows that every * -preserving morphism is a Bayesian inverse of its Bayesian inverse and Theorem 6.27 shows that a Bayesian inverse of a deterministic morphism is a disintegration. Section 7 contains statements that were proven explicitly for finite sets and stochastic maps for which we did not find diagrammatic proofs. Section 8 does the same but for CPU maps on finite-dimensional C * -algebras (and sometimes von Neumann algebras). An interesting result here is Theorem 8.3, which shows that if a CPU map between two von Neumann algebras has a disintegration, then the map is a.e. deterministic. In addition, Theorem 8.27 proves that all disintegrations are Bayesian inverses.
What is Bayes' theorem?
To provide a setting for our results, we would first like to illustrate that Bayes' theorem can be described purely diagrammatically [9] , [6] , [4] , [3] , [10] . 5 We will presently illustrate it in the case of finite sets and stochastic maps (for the reader unfamiliar with the notation, we will briefly review it after the statement of the theorem). 
Furthermore, for any other g ′ satisfying this condition, g = q g ′ .
We quickly recall some notation to explain the theorem (see [10] , [27] , and [24] for a more leisurely introduction). 7 If X and Y are finite sets, a stochastic map X f Y is an assignment sending x ∈ X to a probability measure f x on Y. The value of this probability measure on y ∈ Y will be denoted by f yx . Stochastic maps are drawn with squiggly arrows to distinguish them from deterministic maps (stochastic maps assigning Dirac delta measures), which are drawn with straight arrows →. Such straight arrows correspond to functions. A single element set will be denoted by {•}. A stochastic map {•} p X is precisely a probability measure on X.
Stochastic maps X f Y g Z can be composed via the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation
(2.5) 5 In these references, Bayes' theorem is formulated as a bijection between joint distributions and conditionals.
Our emphasis is on the process of inference from conditionals, which will be used more in the non-commutative setting. Why this is so will be explained in [28] . To the best of our knowledge, the first reference that explicitly draws the diagram (2.2) is Fong's thesis [9] (see the section "Further Directions"), though it is formulated using string diagrams. Here, we have elevated this diagram to encapsulate what the statement of Bayes' theorem is. 6 The equals sign in this diagram indicates that the diagram commutes. The notation is meant to be consistent with higher categorical notation. Namely, we think of this equality as the identity 2-cell. We will not comment on higher categorical generalizations in this paper. 7 The reader may also enjoy the short introductory video lectures available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLSx1kJDjrLRQksb7H9fqRE8GVMJdkX-4A. f is p-a.e. equivalent to h, written f = p h, whenever p x ∈ X : f yx = h yx for some y ∈ Y = 0, (2.6) i.e. the set on which f and h differ is a set of p-measure zero. Finally, the map X ∆ X − − → X × X is determined by the function ∆ X (x) := (x, x) for all x ∈ X.
With all this notation explained, the reader can now verify that the diagram (2.2) in Bayes' theorem reads g xy q y = f yx p x (2.7)
for all values of x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. This is Bayes' rule for point events. 8 The case of Bayes' rule for more general events is a simple consequence of this rule. The morphism g is called the Bayesian inference associated to (f, p, q).
Quantum Markov categories
We begin by defining our main categories of study. In what follows, let Z 2 = {0, 1} be the abelian group, where 0 is the identity and 1 + 1 := 0. Let BZ 2 be the one object category whose set of morphisms equals Z 2 with composition as addition modulo 2.
Morphisms in C that get sent to 0 are called even and morphisms that get sent to 1 are called odd. A collection of morphisms that is either all even or all odd is said to be homogeneous. A quantum Markov category is a Z 2 -graded symmetric monoidal category (C, ⊗, I) together with a family of morphisms ∆ X :
all depicted in string diagram notation as
for all objects X in C. These morphisms are required to satisfy the following conditions 9 in more standard (albeit abusive) notation. 9 These conditions will be examined in the case of C * -algebras in Example 3.12 to assist the reader in deciphering such string diagrams.
In addition, id X , ∆ X , and ! X are declared to be even for all X. The collection of involutions * X is declared to be homogeneous. The map ∆ X is sometimes called copy or duplicate and the map ! X is sometimes called delete or ground. If, in addition, . Also notice that we have not required * I to be the identity (the latter of which is always even). This is potentially awkward for string diagram computations because we now have to keep track of this whenever we ever pull * X through ! X as in the last identity in (3.5).
Fortunately, this will never show up in any of the string-diagrammatic computations that will follow. We have also replaced the axiom 
The terminology 'Markov category' was first used by Fritz [10] . The terminology 'CD category' was used earlier by Cho-Jacobs, which is also where the axioms were first provided [3] . We prefer the terminology 'Markov category' because this sounds more appropriate for our generalization to the non-commutative context. 11
Remark 3.10. The choice of a functor C → BZ 2 means that the composite of two morphisms of parities p 1 and p 2 is of parity (p 1 + p 2 ) mod 2. If * is odd, then pre-or post-composing with * sets up two bijections C even (X, Y) → C odd (X, Y).
Example 3.11. One of our main examples of a quantum Markov category is
FinStoch. An object of FinStoch is a finite set. A morphism from X to Y is a Markov kernel/stochastic map/conditional probability from X to Y. Such a morphism assigns to each element x ∈ X a probability measure on Y. Composition is defined by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation (i.e. summing over all intermediaries). The tensor product is the cartesian product of sets and the product of Markov kernels for morphisms. The tensor unit is the single element set, often denoted by {•}. The maps ∆ X and ! X are given by ∆ X (x) := (x, x) and ! X (x) = • for all x ∈ X. FinStoch is also a classical Markov category upon setting * X = id X because axiom (3.8) holds. See Section 2 above, [10, Example 2.5], and [27, Section 2.1] for more details. One can also drop the condition that a morphism sends each point to a probability measure and instead associate to each point a signed measure. The resulting category is also a quantum Markov category (see Example 11.27 in [10] but drop the condition that the total measure must be 1).
Example 3.12. Our second (and motivating) main example of a quantum Markov category (that is not a classical Markov category) is fdC*-AlgU op . The objects here are finite-dimensional unital C * -algebras (henceforth, all C * -algebras will be assumed unital). Every such finitedimensional C * -algebra is * -isomorphic to a finite direct sum of (square) matrix algebras [8, Theorem 5.5]. A matrix algebra will be written as M n (C) indicating the C * -algebra of complex n × n matrices. On occasion, the shorthand M n may be used in place of M n (C). A morphism from A to B in fdC*-AlgU op is either a linear or conjugate-linear unital map
Notice that the function goes backwards because of the superscript op (in the physics literature, this convention is known as the Heisenberg picture). The tensor product is the tensor product of finite-dimensional C * -algebras. For example,
where X and Y are finite sets labelling the matrix factors. A similar situation holds for the tensor product of morphisms. The * operation is the involution on C * -algebras. Notice that if B F A is linear (conjugate linear), then F • * is conjugate linear (linear) since (F • * )(λb) = F(λb * ) = λF(b * ) = λ(F • * )(b) (and similarly if F is conjugate linear). We will ignore associators and unitors in what follows. This is permissible thanks to Mac Lane's coherence theorem [22] . We define the copy map ∆ A from A to A ⊗ A in fdC*-AlgU op to be the multiplication map determined on elementary tensors by
in fdC*-AlgU. The map µ A is linear and unital, but it is not a * -homomorphism unless A is commutative. In fact, µ A is not even positive in general (cf. Example 3.19). Nevertheless, it is coherent with the involution * (in the sense of the last identity in (3.3)) because (ab) * = b * a * for all a, b ∈ A. Finally, the discard map ! A : A → C in fdC*-AlgU op is defined to be the unit inclusion map
in fdC*-AlgU. Here are some of the conditions of a quantum Markov category and their corresponding expressions in terms of these morphisms:
One can check that the rest of the axioms of a quantum Markov category are satisfied for fdC*-AlgU op . In fact, the larger category where we drop the unit-preserving assumption on the morphisms is also a quantum Markov category. In this paper, we will denote this latter category by fdC*-Alg op . We will be lax with our notation and from now on not distinguish between the category fdC*-AlgU and its opposite. When we refer to fdC*-AlgU as a quantum Markov category, we will always mean its opposite. In all the string diagrams that appear, the only difference is that we will compose from the top to the bottom of the page (rather than from the bottom to the top).
The following provides an example of an important subcategory of fdC*-AlgU that is not a quantum Markov category. Nevertheless, it is the main category of interest here and the fact that it embeds into a quantum Markov category is crucial for the theorems that will follow for Bayesian inference and disintegrations. Example 3.19. Let fdC*-AlgCPU be the subcategory of fdC*-AlgU consisting of the same objects as fdC*-AlgU but whose morphisms are (linear) completely positive unital (CPU) maps. This is not a quantum Markov category because there is no CPU map A ⊗ A G o G o G G A satisfying the conditions of Definition 3.1. In fact, the no-cloning (no-broadcasting) theorem states that a CPU map µ A : Theorem 6] ). The reader should be able to reconstruct a simple proof of this claim from the Multiplication Theorem, which will be stated below in Lemma 4.8.
We now introduce a few properties that we wish to distinguish for certain morphisms in quantum Markov categories. The first is the notion of a * -preserving morphism.
Remark 3.22. In a quantum Markov category C, copy ∆ is * -preserving if and only if * is the identity. The collection of all objects and * -preserving morphisms of C form a subcategory of C.
Definition 3.23. Let C be a quantum Markov category. An even (odd) morphism X f Y in C is called causal 13 
In pictures,
(3.24) Example 3.25. A morphism in any of the categories of finite sets together with morphisms that associate to each point a signed measure is causal iff the total measure associated to each point is 1. A morphism in any of the categories of finite-dimensional C * -algebras we have introduced is causal if and only if it is unital.
Remark 3.26. It follows from the axioms in Definition 3.1 that id X , ∆ X , ! X , and * X are automatically causal for all X. If f is deterministic, (3.30) easily follows. For the converse, grounding the upper right string in (3.30) shows f is * -preserving. Determinism of f then follows from * 2 = id and the fact that f is * -preserving and satisfies this condition:
One can also show that the tensor product of two deterministic maps is deterministic. This follows from naturality of the braiding, the definition of determinism, the third identity in (3.4), and the second identity in (3.5). 
2-Positive subcategories
The following definition of positivity is due to Fritz [10, Definition 11.22 ]. However, based on Example 4.13, we have decided to use the terminology '2-positivity' instead.
must also hold.
The fact that FinStoch is a 2-positive category was proved in [10, Example 11.25] (in fact, this was proved for the larger category of Markov kernels between measurable spaces). Here, we prove a non-commutative version of this result. To prove this theorem, we recall two important results regarding multiplicative properties of CPU maps. Proof. See [21, Proposition 6] (or [16] and [7] for the original references). 
Proof of Lemma 4.8 . See [21, Theorem 4] for a proof or the more general result that we will prove later (Lemma 8.28).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let C G B F A be a pair of composable CPU maps of C * -algebras such that the composite F • G is a * -homomorphism. Then,
holds for all C ∈ C. Thus, all inequalities become equalities. In particular,
By the Multiplicative Theorem (Lemma 4.8), this implies
Since F and G are * -preserving and * is an involution, this reproduces condition (4.2).
Example 4.13. The subcategory of all 2-positive unital maps between finite-dimensional C *algebras is also a 2-positive subcategory of fdC*-AlgU. This is because all of the lemmas used to prove Theorem 4.5 also hold for 2-positive unital maps. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the subcategory of finite-dimensional C * -algebras together with positive unital maps is not a 2-positive subcategory of fdC*-AlgU. To see this, take A = B = M n (C) (with n 2) and set f := T =: g, where T is the map that takes the transpose of matrices. This map is known to be positive and unital, but it is not 2-positive. Furthermore, g • f = T 2 = id, which is deterministic. Nevertheless, we have
This prompts the following question: is the subcategory of 2-positive unital maps the largest 2positive subcategory of fdC*-AlgU that contains all CPU maps? This would support our choice of using the terminology '2-positive. ' We will not answer this question here, but if this is the case, then Fritz' definition of a positive subcategory seems to capture not quite positivity, but some categorical notion of 2-positivity. A state on an object X in C is a causal morphism I p X in C. Such a state will be drawn in string-diagrammatic notation as
The preceding definition suffices for our main two examples FinStoch and fdC*-AlgCPU. Theorem 3] ). Hence, the states we are considering coincide with the usual states on C *algebras.
Convention 4.23. In everything that follows, for a given quantum Markov category, we will always work with a 2-positive subcategory unless otherwise stated. This means that for any quantum Markov category discussed, we will implicitly choose a 2-positive subcategory and all 2-positive morphisms and states will be from that subcategory. When working with finitedimensional C * -algebras, the 2-positive subcategory that we will always pick is fdC*-AlgCPU.
Almost everywhere equivalence
The following definition is based on the insightful observation of Cho and Jacobs that a.e. equivalence has a diagrammatic formulation [3] . However, we distinguish two versions of their definition to isolate the one most suitable for the quantum Markov categories we will work with. When f is both right and left p-a.e. equivalent to g, we will say f is p-a.e. equivalent to g, and the notation f = p g will be used.
Remark 5.4. One can also replace the state I p X with an arbitrary 2-positive morphism Θ p X, as done by Fritz [10, Definition 13.1], to obtain more general notions of p-a.e. equivalence. We will occasionally, but rarely, use this. Note that we demand p to be in C as opposed to M to avoid developing an abstract theory of Jordan decompositions in this language.
The fact that we have two notions of a.e. equivalence may seem strange. We will see that for * -preserving morphisms, the two notions of a.e. equivalence are themselves equivalent. However, if the morphisms are not * -preserving, which can happen in the quantum setting (cf. Remark 5.26, Proposition 5.42, and Remark 6.10), there are instances where the notions are actually inequivalent. be a (not necessarily commuting) diagram of * -preserving morphisms in a quantum Markov category. Then
(5.7)
Proof. Assume the left-hand-side of (5.7) holds. Then One then rewinds the steps with f replaced by g, h replaced by k, and p replaced by s. A completely analogous argument holds if the right-hand-side of (5.7) is assumed. Corollary 5.9. In a quantum Markov category (using the same notation as in Definition 5.1), f is right p-a.e. equivalent to g if and only if f is left p-a.e. equivalent to g provided f, p, and g are * -preserving.
In particular, if f is left (or right) p-a.e. equivalent to g, then f is p-a.e. equivalent to g.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 5.5 in the special case described by the diagram .
(5.10)
Remark 5.11. The * -preserving condition in Proposition 5.5, and hence Corollary 5.9, is crucial.
Here is a counter-example in the category of finite-dimensional C * -algebras and unital linear maps. Let A and B both be M 2 (C) and let ω = tr(ρ · ), where ρ = 1 0 0 0 . Let F = id M 2 (C) and set
Then, one can easily check that
This is because F ′ is not * -preserving. However, if ρ happens to commute with the images of F and F ′ , then the two notions agree and all the expressions in (5.13) are equal (due to the cyclicity of trace). Therefore, one can view the difference of these two notions of a.e. equivalence as being related to the non-commutativity present in the quantum setting.
Our notion of a.e. equivalence for morphisms of C * -algebras from [27] was motivated by the GNS construction and had little to do with diagrammatic reasoning. Amazingly, our notion coincides with the categorical Definition 5.1 due to Cho and Jacobs [3] when the morphisms in question are * -preserving. However, there are subtle differences when the morphisms are merely linear (this difference will be important for the notions of a.e. determinism and Bayesian inference).
Lemma 5.14. Let A be a C * -algebra, let A ω C be a state, let P ω be its support, and set P ⊥ ω :
In particular, ω(P ⊥ ω A) = 0 and ω(AP ⊥ ω ) = 0 for all A ∈ A.
Proof. See Section 1.14 of Sakai [30] . 
Then the following facts hold. for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B. This proves (c) implies (b). Thus, the last three conditions have been shown to be equivalent.
ii. This follows from the previous steps and Corollary 5.9 (ω is * -preserving because it is a state), which proves (a) is equivalent to (b).
Remark 5.20. One of the convenient properties of condition (c) in Theorem 5.16 is that it is linear and involves only a single variable, as opposed to the definition of right a.e. equivalence from (5.2), which involves two variable inputs. More generally, we have the following result. Given a diagram We have two reasonable notions of being deterministic almost everywhere. Although we mostly work with states, we include the generalizations for 2-positive morphisms for future reference (cf. Remark 5.4). However, this is not generally true in a quantum Markov category even if f is * -preserving. This is exactly because is not necessarily * -preserving. This has important consequences for a.e. determinism even in the category of finite-dimensional C * -algebras. In the non-commutative context, (5.25) might be more appropriately called right p-a.e. deterministic. However, since we will mostly use (5.25), we prefer to drop the word 'right.'
Example 5.28. Using the same notation as in Definition 5.24 but in the category FinStoch, a stochastic map f is p-a.e. deterministic if and only if
What this entails will be spelled out in more detail in Proposition 5.41. We will now examine in a bit more detail the two notions of almost everywhere determinism introduced. We will first prove a fact regarding the interaction between the involution * and the associativity of the copy morphism ∆. Since f x is a probability measure, this implies there exists a unique y such that f yx = 1. Hence, for such x, set g yx := f yx . Now, if x is such that p xθ = 0 for all θ, then set g x to be any (unit) point measure. Then g is deterministic and f = p g.
One might try to use Lemma 5.32 in an attempt to prove Lemma 5.36 in an arbitrary quantum Markov category (provided the morphisms are * -preserving). However, the claim turns out to be false. In fact, in the category of finite-dimensional C * -algebras and CPU maps, if a CPU map is a.e. deterministic, it is not necessary equivalent to a deterministic map (see Remarks 8.19 and 8.21 for a counter-example). Proof. We will supply a simple counter-example in the subcategory fdC*-AlgCPU of the quantum Markov category fdC*-AlgU. Set B ≡ A := M 2 (C) and set ρ := 1 0 0 0 . Let ω := tr(ρ · ) be its associated state, and let P ω denote its support (in this case, ρ = P ω ). For any λ ∈ (0, 1), set
which explicitly shows that F and G are CP. In terms of their action on matrices, these maps are given by from which it easily follows F and G are unital, and therefore CPU. These maps are ω-a.e. equivalent because multiplying both expressions by P ω on the right gives the same result (we are freely using the equivalent notions of a.e. equivalence from Theorem 5.16 because F and G are CP and hence * -preserving). Using these formulas, we find
which is non-zero in general. Therefore, the equality on the right-hand-side of (5.37) does not hold in fdC*-AlgCPU. It is also not enough to know the value of that CPU map followed by Ad P ω . For example, for a CPU map M n (C) F M n (C) and the density matrix ρ = e 1 e * 1 (e 1 is the first standard unit vector of C n ) with associated state ω = tr(ρ · ), if Ad P ω • F is ω-a.e. equivalent to Ad P ω , then F is not necessarily equal to the identity. However, if F is ω-a.e. equivalent to the identity, then it is equal to the identity. The latter result was proved in [27, Theorem 3.67 ].
For the former statements, consider the n = 2 case take the CPU map (which is even a *isomorphism)
Then ω = ω • F, Ad P ω • F = Ad P ω , and F • Ad P ω = Ad P ω , but F = id M n . Thus, one should keep in mind that there is a good deal of information about F(B) in F(B)P ω , which would be lost if one only worked with P ω F(B)P ω . This remark will be important in subsequent work [26] when we compare and contrast our definition of quantum Bayesian inference to the Bayesian inference of Leifer [18] . 
(6.2) Such data will be denoted by (f, p, q) . A disintegration is also called a regular conditional probability and an optimal hypothesis. A Bayesian inverse of (or a Bayesian inference for) (f, p, q) is a causal morphism Y g X such
This condition will be referred to as the Bayes condition. It will often (though not always) be assumed that the morphisms f and g are * -preserving and belong to C. However, causality is not necessary for this. It is enough that f is p-a.e. causal. Similarly, if g is not assumed to be causal, then g is still q-a.e. causal if g, q, and p are * -preserving.
Once we learn that disintegrations are Bayesian inverses, this will also imply the same for disintegrations. Nevertheless, we will not dwell on a.e. causality and mostly work with causal morphisms since these physically correspond to probability-preserving processes.
Remark 6.7. The definition of a disintegration in Definition 6.1 differs from the one introduced in [27] in that we are no longer assuming X f Y is deterministic. The reason for this is to apriori allow the possibility for more morphisms to have disintegrations. However, it turns out that a morphism X f Y together with a state I p X in FinStoch has a disintegration if and only if f is p-a.e. deterministic (cf. Theorem 7.8). In the more general setting of finitedimensional C * -algebras, we prove a similar result: if f has a CPU disintegration, then f is p-a.e. deterministic (cf. Theorem 8.3).
The following Lemma shows that Bayesian inverses are a.e. unique whenever they are *preserving. Applying Corollary 5.9 gives the required result.
Without assuming g and g ′ are * -preserving in Lemma 6.8, we can only conclude that g is left q-a.e. equivalent to g'. Since our convention of a.e. equivalence in the non-commutative setting is right a.e. equivalence, this does not agree with our convention (unless g and g ′ are * -preserving or satisfy some other specialized condition). Remark 6.10. In the category fdC*-AlgU, if two Bayesian inverses are not * -preserving, then they need not be a.e. equivalent. Explicit examples are provided in [28] .
The following proposition shows that disintegrations are functorial in appropriate quantum Markov categories. Proposition 6.11. Let C ⊆ M be a 2-positive subcategory of a quantum Markov category where composing state-preserving a.e. equivalence classes of morphisms in C is well-defined. If g :
respectively, then f • g is a disintegration of (g • f, p, r).
Proof. The probability-preserving condition is immediate. The composite f • g is causal because the composite of causal morphisms is causal. The second condition follows from
since composing a.e. equivalence classes of morphisms is well-defined. Remark 6.13. The composition of a.e. equivalence classes of morphisms is well-defined in our main two examples, namely in FinStoch and fdC*-AlgCPU. See Proposition 3.106 in [27] for precise details and a proof.
Bayesian inversion, on the other hand, is functorial in any quantum Markov category. Proposition 6.14. If Z g Y and Y f X are Bayesian inverses of (X f Y, I p X, q := f • p) and
, respectively, then f • g is a Bayesian inverse of (g • f, p).
Proof. As before f • g is causal. Secondly, the calculation 
(with p and q states) in a quantum Markov category, if q = f • p and g is a Bayesian inverse of (f, p, q), then f is a Bayesian inverse of (g, q, p).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 5.5 applied to the diagram The implication towards the right proves the proposition.
Remark 6.20. The * -preserving assumption for the Bayesian inverses in Proposition 6.16 is crucial. This is due to Remark 5.11.
for all states p :
Proof. The forward implication follows immediately from the definition of f being deterministic. For the reverse implication, fix x ∈ X and let p be the Dirac measure at x. The assumption then reads 
ii. For every probability measure {•} p X, f has a deterministic disintegration of (f, p, q := f • p).
Proof. If f is invertible, then p :
Conversely, suppose f satisfies the two conditions. The first condition implies f is surjective by setting q := δ y for various y ∈ Y. The second condition implies f is injective by setting p x := 1 |X| for all x ∈ X. In more detail, let g be a deterministic disintegration of (f, p, q). If f were not injective, then there exists a y ∈ Y such that f −1 ({y}) contains more than a single element. Since q y > 0 and p x > 0 for all x ∈ f −1 ({y}), it must be that 1 > g xy > 0 for those same values of x. This contradicts the fact that g is deterministic.
Ỹ := {ỹ 0 ,ỹ ′ 0 } be a two element set and define Letq := π • q so thatqỹ 0 ,qỹ′ 0 > 0. Since π is deterministic, a disintegrationỸ π Y of (π, q,q) exists by Theorem 7.1. By Proposition 6.11, h := g • π is a disintegration of (f := π • f, p,q).
′ 0 = 0, a contradiction since it was assumed that p x 0 > 0. This tells us that disintegrations are only possible for maps that are deterministic (almost everywhere). So although we can use disintegrations to reverse deterministic maps, we cannot use them to reverse stochastic maps in general. Therefore, one might ask if there is any reasonable way to reverse stochastic maps. For this, we have Bayes' theorem (cf. Theorem 2.1). Proving Bayes' theorem is entirely straightforward-a formula for a Bayesian inverse g of (f, p, q) is given by
We now describe how disintegrations are special kinds of Bayesian inverses. Proof. The goal is to prove Bayes' diagram commutes, i.e. f yx p x = g xy q y for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. If p x = 0, then 0 = y∈Y g xy q y (since p = g • q) so that g xy q y = 0 for all y ∈ Y. Thus, the diagram commutes for all x ∈ N p and y ∈ Y. To see that it also commutes when p x > 0, it suffices to assume f is deterministic by ii. The map f is p-a.e. equivalent to a deterministic map (or equivalently p-a.e. deterministic by Proposition 5.41) if and only if a Bayesian inference of (f, p, q) is a disintegration of (f, p, q).
In summary, not every deterministic map is invertible, but every measure-preserving deterministic map has a disintegration in the enlarged category including stochastic maps. In this enlarged category, not every measure-preserving stochastic map has a disintegration, but every such map has a Bayesian inverse and Bayesian inverses reduce to disintegrations if and only if the original maps are a.e. deterministic. How much of this remains true in the quantum setting? What new insight does this perspective offer us in the quantum setting? What other categories admit such structure and properties? The rest of this paper is dedicated to answering the first question. The second question is the subject of a forthcoming paper [26] (partial answers in the classical setting are provided in Jacobs' recent work [15] ). The last question has not yet been explored by the author.
Quantum Bayesian inference
In what follows, we will use the conventions and terminology of [27] , much of which was reviewed in Example 3.12, Theorem 5.16, and elsewhere in this paper. Although disintegrations were defined more generally in Definition 6.1, we set the notation here. 
the latter diagram signifying commutativity ξ-a.e.
We now state and prove a theorem that says if a quantum operation has a state-preserving left-inverse, then the quantum operation is deterministic almost surely. This is a non-commutative generalization of Theorem 7.8.
A be a CPU map, and set ξ := ω • F. If there exists a disintegration of (F, ω, ξ), then F is ω-a.e. deterministic.
The following proof will be broken up into a series of three Lemmas, which will be useful in their own right. Our proof of Theorem 8.3 is completely inspired by (and closely follows) the proof of Theorem 6.38 in Attal's notes [1] . B(H) has a CPU left inverse G, then F is a * -homomorphism. In his theorem, H can be infinite-dimensional. If one allows a different codomain for F, then this claim is false. Indeed, a simple example, even in finite dimensions, is
It is therefore interesting that merely adding a state-preserving assumption to Attal's theorem guarantees the * -homomorphism claim almost surely regardless of the domain and codomain (and is even valid for von Neumann algebras). ii. For every state A ω C, a deterministic disintegration of (F, ω, ξ := ω • F) exists.
A large part of the following proof uses [21, Theorem 5] and its proof. We now move to Bayesian inference in quantum mechanics. Although we have formulated the definition of a Bayesian inverse generally in Definition 6.1, we restate it here using the notation of C * -algebras. Definition 8.25. Let B F A be a CPU map, let A ω C be a state, and set ξ :
In the following theorem, we show that all disintegrations are Bayesian inverses in the category fdC*-AlgCPU. Interestingly, the proof is general enough to avoid using an explicit formula for disintegrations. Theorem 8.27. Let A ω C be a state on A, let B F A be a CPU map, and set ξ := ω • F. If there exists a disintegration A G B of (F, ω, ξ), then G is a Bayesian inverse of F.
The proof of this theorem will use the following lemma. Note that this lemma is not a consequence of, nor does it imply, Lemma 8.9 due to how the supports are placed in the expressions. The proof of Lemma 8.28 below follows exactly the same steps as the proof of Theorem 4 in [21] . The previous theorem has a converse, which we have already proved but we state it for the special case for finite-dimensional C * -algebras. Theorem 8.37. Let A ω C be a state on A, let B F A be a ω-a.e. deterministic map, and set ξ := ω • F. If A G B is a Bayesian inverse of F, then G is a disintegration of (F, ω, ξ).
Proof. This is Theorem 6.27 and Remark 6.29 in the context of finite-dimensional C * -algebras and CPU maps.
In conclusion, we have learned the following facts regarding disintegrations and Bayesian inference in fdC*-AlgCPU. i. If a Bayesian inference for (F, ω, ξ) exists, it is ξ-a.e. unique.
ii. Suppose a Bayesian inference G for (F, ω, ξ) exists. Then the map F is ω-a.e. deterministic if and only if G is a disintegration of (F, ω, ξ).
iii. If (F, ω, ξ) has a disintegration G, then F is ω-a.e. deterministic and G is a Bayesian inference for (F, ω, ξ).
iv. If F is ω-a.e. deterministic, then a Bayesian inference exists if and only if a disintegration exists. v. A Bayesian inference for (F, ω, ξ) need not exist.
Hence, not every deterministic map is invertible nor does every deterministic map equipped with a state have a disintegration (cf. [27, Section 5.2] ). Nevertheless, there are more deterministic morphisms admitting disintegrations than inverses. In this enlarged category of C * -algebras and (state-preserving) CPU maps, more morphisms have Bayesian inverses. Therefore, we have partially answered our first question addressed at the end of Section 7.
